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By the 1980s, fertility levels had started to fall across the 
developing world. Lower fertility was held to be posi-
tively associated with social and economic development, 
lower child mortality, and arrested environmental deg-
radation. Programs, both global and national, sought to 
bring about fertility decline by enhancing access to mod-
ern forms of contraception and improving reproductive 
and sexual health services, particularly for women. In re-
cent years, increasing attention has been paid to the possi-
ble “stalling” of fertility declines in many countries across 
the developing world (see, for example, Bongaarts 2006 
and Westoff and Cross 2006:2).1 No consistent definition 
of what constitutes a stalled fertility decline is currently 
in use, however. Bongaarts (2006:2) determines whether 
a stall has occurred by whether the total fertility rate “did 
not decline between two successive DHS surveys while 
the country was in midtransition”—that is, when the TFR 
was between 5 and 2.5 children per woman. In other lit-
erature (see, for example, Aghajanian 1991 and Bongaarts 
2003), the concept of stalling typically is discussed with-
out a precise definition of the term. Other researchers em-
ploy the term without defining it at all (for example, Elti-
gani 2003 and Westoff and Cross 2006). Semantically, the 
term carries with it a strong sense that fertility levels are 
unchanging, an impression strengthened by Bongaarts’s 
test of “did not decline.” 
This article proposes a new definition for “stalled fer-
tility decline,” one that provides greater empirical preci-
sion and can take advantage of the rich data available from 
demographic surveillance systems. We then apply this al-
ternative definition to retrospective and prospective data 
collected from a demographic surveillance system in rural 
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, to derive estimates of age-
specific and total fertility and to determine whether the 
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fertility decline has, indeed, stalled. Finally, we consider 
possible explanations for the phenomena observed.
Criteria for Stalled Fertility Declines
In two early works on the subject, Gendell (1985 and 1989) 
puts forth four criteria for determining whether a stall in 
fertility decline has occurred. First, a fertility decline must 
already have begun; that is, total fertility must have fall-
en by more than one-fifth from a high level (five or more 
children per woman of reproductive age). Thus, fertility 
levels must have fallen by at least twice the amount of 
the 10 percent decline that is conventionally regarded as 
heralding the beginning of a fertility transition (Caldwell 
et al. 1992). Second, in order to distinguish a stall from a 
generally slow decline, Gendell requires that the decline 
should have been fairly rapid—of the order of at least 0.15 
(and preferably 0.25) of a child per woman per year for 
at least five years. Third, although a clear stall would be 
reflected in no change in fertility levels over some period 
of time (Gendell suggests five years, or four at a mini-
mum), more realistically he assumes a stall to have oc-
curred if a substantial deceleration is evident in the pace 
of fertility decline. He defines substantial deceleration as 
at least a halving of the rate of decline in one period com-
pared with the rate that immediately preceded it, if the 
first two requirements have been met. Fourth, Gendell 
implicitly concedes that a stalled fertility decline may still 
show gradually declining fertility. He excludes cases in 
which fertility has “brought the TFR close to the long-run 
replacement level” (Gendell 1985:2), arguing that such 
scenarios undermine the essential concept of a stalled 
fertility transition. Theoretically, this final requirement is 
highly problematic because it carries with it the inevitable 
presupposition that fertility transition ends at replace-
ment-level fertility, an assumption described by Paul 
Demeny (1997) as “implausible.” Certainly, in Western 
Europe, evidence of sustained total fertility substantially 
below replacement levels belies this assumption (see, for 
example, Lesthaeghe and Willems 1999). Accordingly, we 
contend that the fourth criterion is not merited.
A more rigorous approach to defining and measuring 
stalled fertility is possible. Building on Gendell’s ideas, 
we propose an alternative definition of stalled fertility 
decline that would require a statistically significant dif-
ference in the rate of fertility decline over two time peri-
ods—with each period greater than or equal to five years’ 
duration but not necessarily of the same length. Prefera-
bly, too, the slope of the line relating to the second period 
should not differ significantly from zero. This second cri-
terion is not statistically robust; a small number of points, 
for example, may not allow us to reject the null hypoth-
esis (slope equal to zero) in favor of the alternative. None-
theless, a clear downward trend, even for a small sample 
size, would show a statistically significant departure from 
zero. This definition encompasses—but more rigorously 
operationalizes—Gendell’s criteria. 
Fertility Decline in South Africa, 1990–2005
Fertility among African South Africans has been falling 
for the better part of 40 years (Moultrie and Timæus 2003), 
a decline noteworthy both for its steady but slow pace 
and for its having been driven by a lengthening of birth 
intervals since contraceptives became widely available in 
the early 1970s (Brown 1987; Moultrie and Timæus 2002; 
Moultrie 2005). Analyses of recent data suggest that the 
trend in fertility in South Africa might continue inexo-
rably downward: between the 1996 and 2001 censuses, 
fertility among African South Africans continued to fall, 
from 3.5 to 3.0 children per woman of reproductive age 
(Moultrie and Dorrington 2004). In KwaZulu-Natal Prov-
ince (the focus of this study), fertility levels among African 
South African women fell at almost the same rate between 
the two censuses, from 3.7 to 3.2 children per woman. The 
earlier figure is strongly congruent with the three-year to-
tal fertility rate (TFR) of 3.7 children for African women in 
this province indicated by the 1998 South Africa Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (DHS), a rate centered almost 
exactly on the census date.2
Camlin and her colleagues (2004) analyzed the retro-
spective fertility data from the Africa Centre Demograph-
ic Information System (ACDIS) using a virtual census 
conducted on 1 January 2001 and exponential trend ex-
trapolation to estimate trends in fertility in earlier years. 
By contrast, this study seeks to elucidate historical trends 
directly from the data, although the results derived are 
essentially similar. Also, the Camlin study did not exam-
ine the prospective data collected after 2001, and the am-
biguities of women’s residency were neither dealt with 
nor acknowledged explicitly. Children born to mothers 
who are resident outside of the demographic surveil-
lance area (DSA) but who are still reported as a member 
of a household in the DSA may or may not be faithfully 
recorded depending on the recall of the respondent in 
each round of the household survey, and the direction of 
any distortion that may result cannot be determined with 
certainty. Error in recall may apply also to the children 
of (absent) resident women in the household born since 
the previous visit. It would seem reasonable, however, to 
anticipate that errors of recall would be greater for chil-
dren born to nonresident women. The magnitude of any 
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such error is likely to be relatively small, however, in light 
of the design of the survey instrument. Consequently, in 
any prospective analysis, restricting the analysis to wom-
en resident in the DSA, and to births to mothers known to 
be resident at the time of the birth, is preferable. 
Methods
The Africa Centre for Health and Population Studies (re-
ferred to here as Africa Centre) demographic surveillance 
site has been well described in the medical and demo-
graphic literature (Hosegood and Timæus 2005; Hose-
good et al. 2005). It covers a population of approximately 
86,000 individuals, both resident and nonresident,3 who 
are members of households in a 435-square-kilometer 
area approximately 250 kilometers (153 miles) northeast 
of Durban, the principal city in the province. The site is 
almost entirely rural, although part of a township is in-
cluded within the area. Unemployment is high: in 2001, 
25 percent of people aged 15–65 years reported that they 
were unemployed and actively seeking work (Case and 
Ardington 2004). Health-care and family planning servic-
es are provided almost exclusively through a network of 
state hospitals and clinics. HIV prevalence in the region 
is exceedingly high: 27 percent of female residents aged 
15–49 and 14 percent of male residents aged 15–54 were 
found to be infected with HIV in 2003–04 (Welz et al. 
2007). Overall, 22 percent of residents aged 15–49 years 
were infected with the virus, with a correspondingly 
devastating implication for the level of adult mortality. 
Mortality of children younger than five also is high, es-
timated at 97 deaths per 1,000 births between 2000 and 
2002 (Garrib et al. 2006). 
These characteristics indicate that the site is not atypi-
cal of a southern African population. An important dif-
ferentiating exception, however, is that contraceptive 
use—both nationally and in the study area—is high by 
African standards, a legacy of the early roll-out of fam-
ily planning and contraceptive services in South Africa, 
commencing in the early 1970s when the government 
was worried about the implications of differential growth 
rates of the African and white populations of the country 
(Moultrie 2005).
Data and Analyses
The fertility data from the Africa Centre are analyzed 
separately and prospectively—a strategy necessitated by 
the start of data collection in ACDIS on 1 January 2000. 
The retrospective analysis covers the period from 1990 to 
1999 and uses the birth histories collected as part of the 
baseline round conducted in 2000. In this round, women 
were asked to provide detailed maternity histories from 
which the calendar year of each child’s birth and the exact 
age of the mother at each birth could be computed.4 
The first round of data collection asked only about 
the histories of women aged 15–49 years. Retrospective 
estimates of fertility for all years are censored to some ex-
tent, therefore, and increasingly so as one looks further 
back in time. The calculation of the estimates of both nu-
merator and denominator (exposure to risk) is relatively 
straightforward from such data. The results, however, are 
not directly comparable with those derived from the pro-
spective analysis because although whether the mother 
was resident on 1 January 2000 is known, the data collect-
ed do not indicate whether she was resident at the time 
of the birth of her children (because no detailed migra-
tion or residency histories were collected in the baseline 
round of the study). As a result, the retrospective data al-
most certainly—and unavoidably—include a number of 
births to women who were not resident at the time. Also, 
children born within the DSA prior to 1 January 2000 but 
whose mothers had emigrated before that date would 
likely not be included in the fertility measurement. Given 
the high levels of out-migration from the DSA (Hill and 
Hosegood 2005; Camlin et al. 2007), the latter births like-
ly would have been excluded, whereas mothers would 
be underrepresented in the estimation of the proportion 
exposed to risk. The direction of the net effect of migra-
tion on the calculated age-specific fertility rates cannot 
be ascertained without a clearer understanding of these 
two distortions. 
The estimation of fertility from the prospective data 
covers the six calendar years from 1 January 2000 through 
31 December 2005. This estimation requires a greater de-
gree of care and attention to detail, and presents a differ-
ent set of challenges. Central to the estimation of fertil-
ity using such data is the need to ensure a definitional 
and logical consistency between the elements of the nu-
merator and denominator in the derivation of estimated 
age-specific fertility rates. This imperative is rendered 
stronger by virtue of the complex and broad rules for de-
termining individual membership of households and by 
the desire to estimate fertility among the residents (as op-
posed to absentee household members) of the DSA.
A linear regression model is fitted to the natural 
logarithm of the TFR so that the resulting rates reflect a 
continuous exponential decline in total fertility. The inde-
pendent variables included in the model are (a) a measure 
of calendar time, and (b) a dummy variable distinguish-
ing whether each time period in the measure of calendar 
time is before [coded 1] or after [coded 0] the presumed 
point of inflection in the fertility rates.5 If an interaction 
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term between the dummy variable and the measure of 
calendar time in the model is statistically significant, the 
implied rates of decline are statistically significant before 
and after the point of inflection. 
Results and Discussion
The number of births and the aggregate person-years of 
exposure from the retrospective (1990–99) and prospec-
tive (2000–05) data are shown in Figure 1. A spike is seen 
in the number of reported births in 1997 from the retro-
spective fertility histories of women present at the base-
line round. No obvious explanation for this spike can 
be offered. The apparent falloff in births prior to 1992 is 
likely attributable in part to the increasing censoring of 
the data.6 In the prospective data, births were deemed 
eligible for inclusion only if the mothers were resident at 
the time of the birth—that is, a residency episode of the 
mother included the date of birth of the child. The annual 
number of births to eligible women in the prospective 
analysis shows a strongly declining trend, from 1,650 in 
2001 to 1,416 in 2005.
The exposure-to-risk line clearly indicates the in-
creased censoring of data the further back one goes from 
the baseline study of January 2000, whereas a gradual 
attrition has occurred in the aggregate exposure of resi-
dent women covered in the demographic surveillance site 
during the six calendar years covered by the prospective 
analysis (2000–05). 
The fertility rates estimated from the retrospective 
and prospective data are shown in Table 1. The impact of 
the spike in births in 1997 is evident in the estimates of fer-
tility for that year, but few other obvious distortions can 
be observed. The estimates of total fertility are generally 
consistent with those for Africans in KwaZulu-Natal from 
the 1996 and 2001 censuses and the 1998 Demographic 
and Health Survey. Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 
2, fertility rates fell in most age groups until the year 2000, 
as Caldwell and his colleagues (1992) suggested would be 
characteristic of the African fertility decline. The excep-
tions are teenagers,7 whose fertility has remained almost 
constant since the mid-1990s, and 45–49-year-olds, whose 
fertility was fairly constant until declining after 2000.
The pace of fertility decline shown by the prospec-
tive analysis is much slower than that indicated by the 
retrospective analysis. Whereas fertility had fallen by 3.3 
Figure 1 Number of births and person-years of exposure, 
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, 1990–2005
Source: Africa Centre Demographic Information System.
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Table 1 Age-speciﬁc and total fertility rates by year, 
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, 1990–2005
 Age-speciﬁc fertility rate
Year 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 TFR
1990 0.083 0.191 0.197 0.219 0.134 0.054 0.010 4.4
1991 0.088 0.190 0.205 0.192 0.132 0.054 0.010 4.4
1992 0.101 0.186 0.201 0.175 0.137 0.054 0.010 4.3
1993 0.091 0.176 0.185 0.181 0.127 0.054 0.010 4.1
1994 0.091 0.158 0.184 0.172 0.114 0.053 0.010 3.9
1995 0.102 0.143 0.179 0.164 0.100 0.050 0.010 3.7
1996 0.085 0.147 0.161 0.161 0.112 0.059 0.007 3.7
1997 0.092 0.166 0.172 0.159 0.115 0.057 0.010 3.9
1998 0.090 0.142 0.133 0.139 0.105 0.041 0.011 3.3
1999 0.084 0.154 0.144 0.145 0.090 0.041 0.009 3.3
2000 0.082 0.137 0.133 0.120 0.079 0.033 0.012 3.0
2001 0.088 0.134 0.130 0.120 0.090 0.035 0.004 3.0
2002 0.083 0.145 0.135 0.105 0.081 0.028 0.005 2.9
2003 0.076 0.148 0.131 0.125 0.067 0.026 0.002 2.9
2004 0.075 0.147 0.126 0.108 0.092 0.031 0.003 2.9
2005 0.073 0.152 0.117 0.102 0.077 0.034 0.002 2.8
Source: Africa Centre Demographic Information System.
Figure 2 Age-speciﬁc fertility rates by age group, KwaZulu-
Natal, South Africa, 1990–2005
Source: Africa Centre Demographic Information System.
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percent per annum in the period from 1990 to 1999, the 
equivalent pace of decline from 2000 through 2005 was 
1.1 percent per annum. As can be seen from the data for 
2000–05 in Figure 2, the pace of decline in fertility has 
slowed in five of the seven age groups. The slowing was 
moderate among women aged 25–34, but was so dramatic 
among those aged 20–24 and 40–44 that fertility actually 
increased over this period in these two age groups.
Of course, the fertility rates derived from the pro-
spective data are not entirely comparable with those from 
the retrospective investigation: the latter reflects the fertil-
ity of women present at the baseline round, irrespective 
of earlier residency; the former is the fertility of residents 
of the DSA. The estimation of the proportion of women 
exposed to risk that takes into account residency episodes 
cannot be precise with biannual data collection. Might 
this definitional difference account for the apparent stall? 
We argue that it does not. Evidence to this effect can be 
marshaled from a comparison of the results presented 
here with those pertaining to the fertility of women who 
had unbroken residency within the DSA during the pe-
riod of investigation—that is, women who had never mi-
grated out of the DSA during the period of investigation. 
The comparison (not shown) reveals that the fertility of 
women who leave and return is not materially different 
from that of women who never leave, even though the 
exposure of those who have never left accounts for less 
than half of the total exposure for all women. 
The data, therefore, suggest a significant and substan-
tial reduction in the pace of fertility decline in the Africa 
Centre DSA population during the past 15 years, with 
the leveling off of the decline occurring sometime around 
2000. Indeed, fertility in the area might have stalled. The 
slowing of the pace of fertility decline has occurred in the 
period since abortion was legalized in 1996,8 but if any ef-
fect were associated with legalized termination of preg-
nancy, it would have increased rather than decreased the 
pace of fertility decline.
Revisiting the Deﬁnition of Stalled Fertility Decline
The fertility trends for the population under investiga-
tion meet all of Gendell’s conditions. Even without the 
ancillary evidence from the two most recent censuses, 
fertility in the district has been falling for some time and 
is certainly more than a fifth lower than it was before the 
South African fertility decline began in the 1960s. The de-
cline has not been as rapid as Gendell specifies, but the 
point that the South African fertility decline is remark-
able for its slow pace has been established in the litera-
ture. Gendell’s third criterion is met: a clear and abrupt 
change in the pace of fertility decline occurred around the 
year 2000 (the rate in the period 2000–05 is less than half 
the rate of the preceding five-year period). With regard 
to his fourth requirement, fertility levels of about three 
children per woman are substantially higher than the cur-
rently estimated replacement fertility rate of between 2.4 
and 2.5 children per woman suggested for South Africa 
(Garenne et al. 2007).
Our revised criteria for a stall, by contrast, allow for 
more rigorous operationalization. In effect, what is tested 
is whether two exponential curves (fitted to the portions 
of the data where the dummy variable is 1 and 0) fit the 
data better than a single exponential curve fitted to all the 
data. Applying this test to the 16 data points derived ear-
lier results in the estimation of the underlying rate of de-
cline (dummy variable = 0) of –0.013 percent per annum 
(as derived earlier), with a 95 percent confidence interval 
of –0.028 to 0.019. That the confidence interval includes 
zero and that the coefficient has a p-value of 0.080 suggest 
that it is not possible to conclude that the underlying rate 
of fertility decline for the most recent period (where the 
dummy variable is equal to zero) is not statistically dif-
ferent from zero. The coefficient of the interaction term is 
estimated to be –0.021 and is statistically significant (p = 
0.022). Together, these coefficients show that the annual 
rate of decline estimated from the retrospective data was 
3.2 percent, a pace of decline that is statistically different 
from the estimated pace of decline in the post-2000 years 
of 1.3 percent per year. Therefore, the rate of change in 
the second period not only differs significantly from the 
rate of change in fertility but also may not be different 
from zero. 
The model is represented graphically in Figure 3. The 
model shows that the two curves fit the data better than 
Figure 3 Models of fertility decline, KwaZulu-Natal, South 
Africa, 1990–2005
Source: Africa Centre Demographic Information System.
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does a single curve. This point is also apparent from the 
autocorrelation of the residuals that arise from fitting the 
single curve. In the second period, the residuals from a 
single curve evidently indicate a clear trend from nega-
tive to positive, implying that the residuals are not ran-
domly distributed. This analysis shows, therefore, that a 
clear difference can be observed in the pace of the fertility 
decline in the Africa Centre DSA for the period 2000–05 
relative to the previous decade. 
Possible Explanations for the Stall
As with the lack of agreement on the criteria for stalls in 
fertility decline in the developing world, no consensus ex-
ists about the causes of such stalls. In his study of countries 
that stalled in midtransition, Bongaarts (2006) finds that 
these countries differ in their socioeconomic characteris-
tics and the stalls are not attributable to reduced access 
to contraception, but that an overriding commonality is 
found in a leveling of demand for contraception and a rise 
in the wanted fertility rate. In a detailed study of Kenya, 
Westoff and Cross (2006) reach similar conclusions. Both 
of these studies stand in contrast to Eltigani’s (2003) study 
of stalled fertility in Egypt, in which the author concluded 
that the failure to lower the fertility desires of compara-
tively well-off women in Egypt eliminated the potentially 
substantial influence of this group in diffusing a prefer-
ence for lower fertility.
Several explanations for the observed stall in fertil-
ity decline in rural KwaZulu-Natal may be considered. 
First, it may be simply an artifice of the data. This expla-
nation is unlikely, however, in light of the strong consis-
tency between the levels in the fertility estimates from 
the retrospective and prospective analyses. Moreover, a 
strong consistency is seen between the fertility schedules 
within each analysis, and most of the divergence in the 
data can be explained by the differing definitions of resi-
dency used in the two investigations. The consistency of 
the fertility schedules also suggests that the trend in fer-
tility seen in the prospective analysis is unlikely to reflect 
random error. 
A second explanation, following the approach of 
Bongaarts (2006) and Westoff and Cross (2006), may be 
sought in the trends in contraceptive use in the DSA over 
the entire duration of the study. Unfortunately, data were 
collected on ever use of contraceptives only at baseline; 
therefore, long-term trends in current contraceptive use 
cannot be examined for the period before 2000. Further-
more, changes in the patterns and trends in contraceptive 
use can be determined only for the period from 2003–04 
to 2005. Should clear leveling off in rates of contraceptive 
adoption or—more importantly in this context—a shift 
in method mix from more to less effective means of con-
traception occur in the wake of a generalized HIV/AIDS 
pandemic, this shift might offer a compelling explanation 
for the slowing decline in fertility in the area. The shift 
in method mix may be highly significant. Great effort 
has been expended to convince women to use condoms 
as protection against HIV/AIDS transmission and—in 
the absence of a significant proportion of dual-method 
use—to protect against both HIV and the risk of becom-
ing pregnant. An increase in condom use at the expense 
of the use of more effective methods may result in a great-
er level of contraceptive failure, unintended pregnancy, 
and commensurately higher fertility, thereby creating the 
impression of a stall in fertility decline.
Although the results from the 2003 South Africa De-
mographic and Health Survey cannot be used to evaluate 
continued trends in current contraceptive use over time 
relative to earlier studies,9 the 1998 DHS reported that 
in KwaZulu-Natal, 58 percent of sexually active wom-
en were currently using any method of contraception 
(Department of Health 2002) and 57 percent were using 
modern methods. At the time the survey was conducted, 
condom use was very low, at less than 3 percent of sexu-
ally active women. The most commonly used methods 
were hormonal (injectables [26 percent] and the pill [14 
percent]). If the data in that survey are restricted to Af-
rican women living in rural KwaZulu-Natal (n = 546), 
the figure for current contraceptive use is 35 percent; the 
vast majority (23 percent, or two-thirds of all women cur-
rently using a method) reported using injectables. Only 
three women reported current use of (male) condoms for 
contraception. 
The detailed data collected by the Africa Centre tells 
a more nuanced story. Between 2003–04 and 2005, current 
use of contraceptives increased from 25 percent to 41 per-
cent, and the increase was roughly equally spread over 
all age groups (see Figure 4). This increase suggests that 
a slowdown in contraceptive adoption is not responsible 
for the apparent stall in fertility, nor is the extent of the 
increase mirrored in the small observed decline in fertil-
ity between 2004 and 2005.
When the trends in contraceptive use by method 
are analyzed, however, an interesting pattern emerges, 
as shown in Figure 5. Data relating to current use of the 
pill and injectables (Depo Provera and Nuristerate) are 
overwhelmingly consistent (albeit showing an outlier in 
the 30–34 age group for Nuristerate in the 2003–04 sur-
vey resulting from the small number of women using the 
method). Current use of all three methods has changed 
marginally between the two dates. Of greater significance 
is the shift in the pattern of condom use, particularly 
among younger women. A detailed investigation into the 
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fieldwork operations in the two rounds of the study that 
collected contraceptive-use data suggests, too, that social-
ly desired response bias is an unlikely explanation. The 
trends suggest, however, that method shift from more to 
less effective methods of contraception cannot explain the 
trajectory of the fertility decline after 2000.10
Finally, the rollout of interventions to prevent moth-
er-to-child transmission of HIV may have allowed HIV-
positive women to consider the possibility of bearing 
(more) children when such a notion was not possible pre-
viously. This change may account for the most recent stall 
in fertility decline, but it is unlikely to explain the stall in 
the early years of the data collection. Furthermore, the 
testing that allows people to obtain knowledge of their 
HIV serostatus has been developed more recently than 
the period of time for which we observe a change in fer-
tility decline, and has been available to those in an age 
group for which the fertility impact of HIV would still 
play a role (via subfecundability). 
During the early years of the pandemic, HIV-infected 
women were discouraged from childbearing. The advent 
of drugs that substantially reduce the risk of mother-to-
child transmission of the virus around the time of de-
livery, however, has eased concerns that HIV-positive 
women will bear infected children who will die young. 
This change of view has been further strengthened by 
the wider availability of antiretroviral therapy used to 
Figure 4 Percentage of women surveyed who reported 
that they were currently using modern contraceptives, by age 
group, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, 2003–04 and 2005
Source: Africa Centre Demographic Information System.
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Figure 5 Percentage of women surveyed who reported that they were currently using modern contraceptives, by method type 
and age group, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, 2003–04 and 2005
Source: Africa Centre Demographic Information System.
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delay progression of the disease among infected people, 
reducing concerns that parents may not live long enough 
to see their children grow up. The stalling of fertility de-
cline seen in KwaZulu-Natal, where programs to prevent 
mother-to-child transmission and to provide HIV treat-
ment were introduced in 2001 and 2004, respectively, may 
be an early indication that the fertility of HIV-positive 
women is currently less affected by their infection than it 
was previously. As more data become available from the 
annual HIV surveillance in the Africa Centre setting, this 
aspect of stalling can be explored in greater detail.
Conclusion
This article offers a new, more robust way of concep-
tualizing a stalled fertility decline and suggests a novel 
approach to quantifying such an event. The application 
of this approach to one poor, rural part of South Africa 
strongly indicates that fertility decline may have stalled. 
The stall may be widespread elsewhere in South Africa, 
but current survey and census data are inadequate to de-
termine whether this is the case. Until now, given the slow, 
sustained pace of fertility decline in South Africa, a stall 
in fertility had seemed highly improbable. In their 1993 
study, Caldwell and Caldwell could not decide whether 
the fertility decline in South Africa had been fast (given the 
institutional forces ranged against Africans) or slow (con-
sidering the comparatively developed nature of the South 
African economy and the strength of the family planning 
programs instituted by the apartheid government). 
Our documenting of this stall is noteworthy for sev-
eral reasons. First, it expands our knowledge of the loca-
tions of stalls in fertility decline in the developing world, 
revealing that a stall has occurred in a southern African 
country that started off with a relatively low level of fer-
tility. Second, the stall does not appear to be associated 
with obviously changed patterns of contraceptive use 
(for example, substitution of methods). Third, the stall 
in fertility decline is not likely to be associated with a 
rise in wanted fertility, in light of the historical evolu-
tion of long birth intervals in South Africa (Moultrie and 
Timæus 2002). This reasoning is buttressed by the argu-
ment by Timæus and Moultrie (2003) that simple typolo-
gies of birth spacing and limiting are inappropriate in a 
South African context; the pattern of childbearing in the 
country is consistent neither with limitation (cessation of 
childbearing when the desired parity has been reached) 
nor with spacing as conventionally defined (bearing a 
subsequent child when the last-born child has reached 
a specified age). Instead, the pattern of childbearing is 
reminiscent of the “permanent postponers” discussed 
by Lightbourne (1985). Likewise, the disrupted and frac-
tured nature of sexual relationships in South Africa, both 
during and after apartheid, with their attendant conse-
quences for gender and power relations, are unlikely to 
provide an explanation of why the fertility decline has 
stalled now rather than in the past.
This study adds to the growing literature that calls 
into question the presumption of a causal association be-
tween HIV and fertility. If the expected effect of HIV is 
only to reduce fertility, the stall in fertility decline in a 
population as severely affected by HIV, according to the 
findings reported by Terceira and her colleagues (2003), 
is remarkable. Certainly, the stall calls into question the 
generalizability of the study by Lewis and his colleagues 
(2004), which suggested that total fertility would decline 
by 0.37 percent for every percentage point of HIV preva-
lence among women aged 15–44 in sub-Saharan Africa. In 
terms of the Africa Centre data, such an effect would sug-
gest that the fertility decline attributable to HIV infection 
would be of the order of 10 percent, or approximately 0.3 
of a child per woman during the past decade. The obser-
vations set forth here may be interpreted, rather, as offer-
ing empirical support to the arguments advanced by Ezeh 
(2003), who finds no association between HIV prevalence 
and fertility intentions. The findings from our study sug-
gest further that—at least in terms of aggregate measures 
of fertility—HIV prevalence is subsidiary in impact to the 
main determinants of fertility (socioeconomic, social, and 
demographic).
Although this study documents and demonstrates a 
new approach to conceptualizing the identification and 
measurement of stalled fertility transitions, much more 
effort must be focused on developing our understanding 
of their causes. We suspect that the search for universal 
explanations, capable of explaining stalls in a multiplic-
ity of situations, is unlikely to be successful; however, 
the more nuanced understanding of local conditions and 
socioeconomic dynamics provided by longitudinal data 
captured by demographic surveillance sites may prove 
invaluable in helping researchers understand why, and 
under what conditions, fertility stalls.
Notes
1 Bongaarts (2006:1) observes that “stalling is a neglected issue” in 
the literature on fertility transitions, but an examination of papers 
presented and session topics discussed at the annual meeting of the 
Population Association of America in the past two years indicates 
that the topic is attracting increased interest.
2 Estimates of fertility from the 2003 DHS are neither presented nor 
compared because they have been shown to be unreliable. Results 
from this survey suggest an impossibly low three-year TFR in 
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KwaZulu-Natal of around 0.6 children per woman (Department of 
Health 2004).
3 Residency is self-defined by household members. Typically, it is the 
place where they keep their daily belongings and spend most nights. 
An individual can be recorded as resident at only one homestead 
at any point in time. At each field-worker visit, all changes in resi-
dency (internal or external in- and out-migration) are recorded.
4 Retrospective birth histories were also collected from new entrants 
to the DSA in the first round in which they were identified as new 
household members. Because these women are known to have 
moved into the area, they are clearly different from those identified 
at the time of the baseline study, so they have been excluded from 
the retrospective analysis.
5 The reason for coding in this order is that the main effect relating to 
the slope refers to the more recent (that is, stalling) period. The coef-
ficient of this main effect, therefore, can readily be tested for wheth-
er it is significantly different from zero. One obvious limitation of 
the model is that the estimates of total fertility are themselves ran-
dom variables. For the kinds of sample sizes required to estimate 
fertility with any degree of reliability, however, the formula for the 
variance of the total fertility rate given by Smith (1992) results in a 
relatively small variance for the total fertility rate, thereby making 
the point-estimate of the rate of decline in fertility influenced less 
by random error. The point of inflection should be determined by 
the data, rather than by supposition. The approach adopted here 
was to use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) goodness-of-fit 
statistic to determine which division of points (into pre- and post-
stall) best fit the data.
6 As mentioned above, retrospective data on fertility were collected 
only for women aged 15–49 at the inception of the study. Therefore, 
estimates of fertility are increasingly censored with each year pre-
ceding the baseline study. In order to estimate the fertility of women 
aged 45–49 five years before the baseline (that is, in 1995), retrospec-
tive reporting of fertility data for women aged 50–54 at the baseline 
would have been required. Evidently, the estimates of older-age 
fertility are censored first. The coincidence is fortunate that fertil-
ity within the older age groups is both much less significant than 
fertility within younger age groups and that absolute changes in 
fertility within these age groups are less dramatic than those within 
younger age groups. Hence, in order to derive a longer series of fer-
tility estimates from the baseline study, the fertility rate in the 45–49 
age group for years before 1996 was constrained to be the average 
fertility rate in that age group in the years 1997–99 (ten children per 
1,000 women), whereas fertility estimates in the 40–44 age group be-
fore 1993 were similarly constrained to be the average fertility rate 
of women aged 40–44 in the years 1994–96 (54 children per 1,000 
women). If fertility has been falling in this population, a result of both 
adjustments would be that the estimated total fertility rates certainly 
will be slightly underestimated for those earliest years and will likely 
reflect a slightly slower pace of fertility decline than that which was 
experienced. Some indication of the lack of sensitivity of the most 
distant observations to the assumptions made about the fertility of 
women older than 40 can be seen by observing that if both the 40–44 
and 45–49 age-specific fertility rates were 25 percent higher, the esti-
mated total fertility rate would increase by less than 2 percent.
7 See Moultrie and McGrath (2007) for further discussion of the con-
tentious subject of fertility rates among teenagers.
8 The legislation became effective in February 1997. The legal frame-
work notwithstanding, availability of abortion services is contin-
gent on the willingness of nurses to perform the procedure. This 
contingency has curtailed women’s access in rural areas such as the 
study site.
9 The data cannot be used for the same reason that the fertility data 
are unreliable: the women in the 2003 survey are disproportionately 
nulliparous and, therefore, have a materially different pattern of 
contraceptive use.
10 Changes in the way data on contraception are collected in ACDIS 
limit the usefulness of these investigations for shedding light on the 
link between changing patterns of contraceptive use and the appar-
ent stall in fertility decline. Nevertheless, we note that the current 
contraceptive-use data are broadly consistent with those observed 
in the 1998 DHS and that the proportion of women in ACDIS re-
porting ever using contraceptives also increased between 2000 and 
2003–04. Most of this increase occurred among younger women 
reporting ever having used condoms.
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